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Abstract 
 
Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to synthesize relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature to develop propositions and suggest a research agenda on the antecedents and 
organisational performance implications of internal audit effectiveness. 
 
Design/methodology/approach– The paper employs institutional theory and Karl Marx's 
theory of the “circuit of industrial capital” to synthesize relevant internal audit literature to 
develop theoretically justifiable propositions and highlight an operational research agenda. 
 
Findings– Propositions and a research agenda are provided on potential antecedents of 
internal audit effectiveness and its possible association with company performance measured 
as rate of return on capital employed. Also, key variables are identified and operationalisation 
issues discussed. 
 
Originality/value– As the extant literature does not provide a canon of internal audit 
effectiveness, the paper's originality is its argument that a positive association between 
compliance with standards for the professional practice of internal auditors and organisational 
goal achievement could serve as an approach to assess internal audit effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the use of the two theories in combination provides additional insights into 
identifying the antecedents of internal audit effectiveness and its measurement. 
 
Introduction 
Internal audit has evolved to a stage where it is regarded as a value adding service to 
organisations (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena and Azzone, 2009; Bou‐Raad, 2000; Enyue, 
1997; Goodwin, 2004; Moeller, 2005; Roth, 2000, 2002). The Global Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) refers to this value‐adding prowess of the function in its latest definition of 
internal auditing (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004): 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed 
to add value and improve an organisation's operations. It helps an organisation 
accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and 
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes. 
It is apparent from the definition that internal audit (IA) is expected to play a value‐adding 
role by providing a wide range of services that help improve organisational processes. The 
function's role in corporate governance, through its services to the board of directors, has 
increased after the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOA) of 2002 (Antoine, 2004; Carey et al., 2006). 
That is, IA is purported to play a pivotal role in assisting organisations to comply with 
regulatory requirements. The foregoing definition and other literature (for 
example, Gramling et al. (2004); Yee et al. (2008)) also suggest that IA contributes to 
accomplishment of organisational objectives by consulting the management and conducting 
operational audits. Based on a study of 11 US organisations, Nagy and Cenker (2002)indicate 
that the practice of IA has generally shifted towards what the above definition stipulates. 
Internal audit could add value by helping organisations achieve economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003) through consulting management and employees and 
assisting in the management of risk (Spira and Page, 2003). Thus it is argued that IA plays a 
value adding role not only by helping conserve existing value through prevention of wastage 
of capital (Marx, 1978, 1981) through fraud and inefficiency but also by improving 
operational processes. For example, the literature indicates that external auditors' reliance on 
internal audit work is considered as an area where internal audit adds value through reduced 
external audit fees (Krishnamoorthy, 2001, 2002; Morrill and Morrill, 2003). Furthermore, 
consistent with Bryer's (1999a, b, 2006) Marxist perspective on accounting, IA can enable 
organisations to improve productivity of labour and increase the return on capital employed. 
The validity of the notion that IA could add value to organisations rests on the implied 
assumption that internal audit is effective. Some of the limited literature in this area (for 
example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2004; Mat Zain et al., 2006; Mihret and 
Yismaw, 2007), nevertheless, suggests that the function may not always be effective. Prior 
studies, some of which are informed by institutional theory (see for example, Al‐Twaijry et 
al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006), show that the degree of IA effectiveness tends to vary with 
country‐ and organisation‐level dynamics in an internal audit milieu (Mihret and 
Woldeyohannis, 2008; Yee et al., 2008) 
Therefore, one approach to assess IA effectiveness could be by examining the extent to which 
the function meets its raison d'être, which is assisting organisations to meet objectives. 
Nonetheless, the association between internal audit effectiveness and organisational 
performance has not been empirically examined sufficiently so as to warrant a conclusion 
that empirical results conform to the definition of IA above. Moreover, although the existing 
literature (for example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2004; Mat Zain et al., 
2006; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007) suggests that IA may not always be effective, the 
antecedents of IA effectiveness appear not fully explored as yet. The limited prior research in 
this area also suggests that the extent of IA effectiveness is associated with country‐level and 
organisation‐specific dynamics prevalent in an IA setting (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et 
al., 2006; Mihret and Woldeyohannis, 2008; Yee et al., 2008). 
Some scholars have advocated future research on IA effectiveness and related issues. For 
example, Ruud (2003) called for research to examine national differences in the role of 
IA. Goodwin (2004) called for a study to examine variations in IA practices between 
government and private organisations. Furthermore, Anderson (2003) pointed out the need to 
identify organisational attributes influencing IA's ability to add value. Likewise, Coram et 
al. (2008) suggested the need to examine IA effectiveness from other perspectives than the 
hitherto dominant perspective of external auditors' perceptions. Also, Hermanson and 
Rittenberg (2003) called for research on the relationship of IA effectiveness with 
organisational performance. In response to these calls, this paper develops a theoretical 
framework for the study of IA based on institutional theory and Karl Marx's theory of the 
circuit of industrial capital as set out in Volume 2 of his Capital (originally published 
posthumously by Friedrich Engels in 1885 based on manuscripts written by Marx before his 
death). It then formulates some propositions on the relationship of IA effectiveness with a 
broad set of contextual antecedents and with organisational performance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines a critique of prior 
theories employed for IA research and suggests alternative theoretical basis. The following 
section develops propositions based on a critical synthesis of relevant literature. The 
penultimate section discusses the outcome of the paper and offers a research agenda; then the 
final section concludes the paper. 
Theoretical perspectives 
The limited IA research has mainly been based on neoclassical economic theories, for 
example, agency theory (Adams, 1994) and transaction cost theory (Spraakman, 1997). In the 
present paper, it is argued that these theories may not sufficiently inform IA research in 
diverse contexts and from varied perspectives. This is because neoclassical economic theories 
make some assumptions that limit these theories' domains of application. For instance, the 
theories presume a developed market economic setting and large volume of transactions 
(Asechemie, 1997). However, sophistication of the market system and volume of transactions 
usually exhibit variations across countries (Reed, 2002; Wallace, 1999) depending on the 
level of economic development. This situation limits the ability of the theories to inform 
internal audit research in a diverse range of settings. Moreover, the notion of market 
equilibrium is a core concept in neoclassical economic theories. Other perspectives, for 
example the Marxist approach, reject the notion of stable self‐reverting equilibria (Hula, 
1984, p. 200). The whole Marxist approach is based on the understanding that capitalism is 
beset with periodic overproduction and crisis. 
Another central assumption of neoclassical economics is that organisational phenomena are 
driven by individuals' pursuit of maximising self‐interest. Marxist and institutional theorists 
criticise this assumption (Hula, 1984, pp. 195‐6, 199) and they maintain that individuals' 
behaviours cannot be abstracted from the social settings in which individuals' actions take 
place. Therefore, neoclassical economic theories may not sufficiently explain IA's 
development and operation in varied settings. On the other hand, institutional theory (Barley 
and Tolbert, 1997) and Marx's theory (Avineri, 1971) recognise the importance of cultural 
and social determinations as a major influence on decision making. With this understanding, 
this paper suggests a combination of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
and Marx's (1978) theory of the circuit of industrial capital as a useful basis for IA research. 
 
 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory explains how organisational structures and practices are shaped through 
changes induced by institutional pressures. Institutional theorists consider organisations as 
members of an “organisational field”, which comprises several organisations or industries 
that are interrelated in some way. This interrelation is exhibited in the form of relationship of 
dependence of some form that leads some organisations to influence others. Barley and 
Tolbert (1997, p. 99) state “institutions are historical accretions of past practices and 
understandings that set conditions on action”. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
institutions result from the processes of “structuration” that create structures. Structures are 
rules and resources that enable functioning of social systems (Giddens, 1984). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983, p. 148) employ the concept of structures to explain the relationships between 
institutions and individual organisations: 
Enterprises only exist to the extent that they are institutionally defined. The process of 
institutional definition, or “structuration”, consists of four parts: an increase in the extent 
of interaction among organisations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined inter‐
organisational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase in the 
information load with which organisations must contend, and the development of a mutual 
awareness among participants in the set of organisations that are involved in a common 
enterprise. 
Structures are considered as the media as well as the products of agents' actions. That is, 
structures constrain actors' behaviours while they are at the same time shaped by actors' 
practices. Giddens (1984) calls this concept the duality of action and structure.Giddens (1984, 
p. 283) also argues that agents gain power to control others due to asymmetries in power 
distributions. He defines control as “the capability that some actors, groups, or types of actors 
have of influencing the circumstances of action of others”. This power is possible because 
agents have resources at their disposal. The resources could be allocative, which are material 
in nature, or authoritative, which arise from agent's capacity to organise and coordinate social 
actors. The concepts of structuration are therefore useful to understand DiMaggio and 
Powell's (1983) institutional theory 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain the coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphisms that 
influence organisational structures and practices. Coercive isomorphism takes place as a 
consequence of organisational attempts to gain legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism occurs 
when organisations respond to uncertainty by emulating practices of other organisations; and 
normative isomorphism arises when institutional changes happen due to organisations' 
recognition of professions. Institutional theory also explains that organisations sometimes 
engage in decoupling; that is, actual organisational practice may differ from what external 
façade of an organisation suggests. This phenomenon enables organisations to appear 
conforming to stakeholder expectations, thereby legitimising their practices (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). Some prior studies (for example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003) employed this 
concept of decoupling to interpret variations between the actual practice of internal audit and 
the standard of work contained in the professional standards for the practice of internal audit. 
Scott (1987, p. 493) supports DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) arguments by showing that 
institutional theory can explain how the “means” and “ends” of organisations change due to 
the impacts of governments and professions. In this line of thinking, internal audit fits into 
the “means” and hence is arguably shaped by the influences of governments and professions. 
Similarly, Zucker (1987)explains institutional theory from the perspectives of isomorphic 
pressures on organisations. However, Zucker regards only mimetic and normative pressures 
as having the impact of institutionalisation. She considers coercive pressures as “de‐
institutionalising” on the grounds that government imposition suggests existence of attractive 
alternatives for organisations to follow. The difference in Zucker's view and that of 
DiMaggio and Powell could be explained by the differences in their ontological perspectives 
to institutionalisation. While Zucker appears to consider institutionalisation as a process that 
is initiated by a motivation from within organisations, DiMaggio and Powell's view considers 
the impact of external pressures as well. 
Institutional theory could inform research at different levels of units of analysis, that is, at the 
level of individual organisations, industries or other collectives (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
The theory is considered appropriate for IA research because it explains organisational 
phenomena without assuming a limited set of organisational goals; that is, without 
necessarily limiting the scope to profit seeking organisations. This theory could also inform 
IA research in countries with diverse stages of development of the market system. Many 
developing countries have either systems characterised by less developed market economy 
(Reed, 2002; Wallace, 1999), or – like the countries of the former Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe – have emerged from communism only in the past 20 years 
(Yee et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, prior research indicates that the influence of government (as compared to the 
impact of market forces) on the development of internal audit tends to be substantial in some 
countries (see for example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003). Institutional theory could, therefore, 
enable a study of internal audit from diverse perspectives compared to the limited and 
limiting principal‐agent (shareholder‐manager) focus of agency theory. Moreover, prior 
research suggests the validity of this theory for internal audit research in the contexts of both 
developing (see example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003) and developed economies (see 
example, Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007). 
Institutional theory has several implications relating to the possible context‐dependence of IA 
effectiveness. For example, in organisations that are exposed to high risk, one might expect 
mimetic pressures to contribute to the development of IA. This is because organisations, as 
part of their efforts to manage risk, may establish IA departments by emulating practices of 
other organisations. This suggests a positive association between level of risk exposure of an 
organisation and internal audit effectiveness (Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, 2006). Likewise, 
the focus of internal audit as assurance or consulting might differ between government and 
private sector organisations (Carcello et al., 2005). Furthermore, professionalisation (of the 
accounting profession) may exert different levels of impact on the advancement – or 
otherwise – of internal audit across institutions (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003, 2004;Albrecht et al., 
1988; Carey et al., 2006; Yee et al., 2008). 
Marx's theory of the circuit of industrial capital 
Marx's (1978) theory of the “circuit of industrial capital”, outlined in the first chapter of 
Volume 2 of Capital, is brought into the accounting literature by Bryer (1999a, b, 2006). 
Bryer highlights investors' pursuit of “surplus‐value” from capital and explains the role of 
accounting as an accountability mechanism in this pursuit. Marx explains capitalist 
production as aiming at the “self‐valorisation” or self‐multiplication of capital, which 
signifies increasing capital by continuously generating surplus‐value (profit) over time. The 
capitalist creates value by using capital to buy commodities and then transforming them to 
other commodities for sale at higher prices. 
Marx presents this process in a circuit of industrial capital: M−C−M′, where M is the original 
capital invested, C represents commodities purchased for input into production and then M′ is 
the money generated by selling the commodities produced. This simple circuit is expanded as 
M−C {MP, LP} … (P) … C′−M′ =M+ΔM. That is, the commodity bought as input comprises 
the means of production, MP, and labour power, LP. The means of production and labour 
power are used in the production process, P, to produce the new commodities C′ that are to be 
sold for a higher price, M′, than the original capital invested, M. The difference between M′ 
and M (that is, ΔM) is surplus‐value, which the valorisation process aims to continuously 
maximise (Foley, 1986). 
In explaining the role of accounting in labour control process, Bryer (2006) uses the concepts 
of “formal” and “real” subsumption of labour which Marx explained in the Appendix to 
Volume 1 of Capital (Marx, 1976, pp. 948‐1084). Formal subsumption of labour applies to 
the early stage of capitalism, whereas real subsumption relates to advanced capitalism. When 
labour is formally subsumed by capital, it is only held accountable for the means of 
production and the production of commodities “as things” (Bryer, 2006, p. 563). On the other 
hand, under “real subsumption”, as in advanced capitalism, labour is also held accountable 
for increasing the rate of return on capital employed, which indicates successful surplus‐value 
creation and realisation, or the use of capital to create more capital (Bryer, 2006, pp. 562‐4). 
Bryer (2006) argues that accounting control systems serve to ensure accountability in the 
value creation process. He maintains that financial accounting serves to ensure accountability 
of senior management to the capitalist and management accounting serves to ensure 
accountability of workers to management (through the chain of command). Internal audit 
could be viewed, from this perspective, as an important element of labour process control. IA 
is of benefit to organisations by providing traditional assurance services and conducting 
performance/operational audits. While assurance audit helps prevent and detect irregularities 
that result from mistakes or fraud, operational/performance auditing helps enhance economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Allegrini and D'Onza, 
2003). 
Therefore, Marx's theory illuminates the concept of value and arguably serves to explain 
internal audit's possible role in organisations not only as an assurance‐based control 
mechanism, but also as a forward‐looking, value‐adding service that maximises the rate of 
return on capital employed. Assurance services of internal audit play an important role in 
corporate governance by strengthening the accountability of management to board of 
directors (Gramling et al., 2004; Yee et al., 2008) (and thus to shareholders) and enhancing 
worker accountability to management. As IA's roles in this regard include enhancing the 
quality of reported earnings (Cohen et al., 2004, 2002; Gramling et al., 2004), IA arguably 
helps improve the accuracy of the reported return on capital employed (ROCE). This 
reasoning is consistent with that of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Doidge et al. (2006), who 
view corporate governance as a means by which shareholders ensure that management 
generates the desired ROCE. 
Thus, consistent with Bryer's (1999a, b, 2006) line of thinking, which considers accounting as 
a framework for other organisational control mechanisms, it could be argued that IA is 
embedded in the broader accountability framework of organisations. Bryer (2006)argues that 
owners of businesses invest in machinery and systems of control to increase the productivity 
and intensity of labour to achieve their overriding aim of maximising the rate of return on 
capital. Operational auditing, assisting in the management of risk, consulting the 
management, and the prevention of fraud and other wastage of capital (Marx, 1978, 1981) are 
directly related to increasing the rate of return on capital. IA could be considered as rightly 
placed in the control process to serve the interest of shareholders. It contributes to the 
mitigation of wastage of capital (Marx, 1978, 1981) by deterring fraud (Raghunandan and 
Mchugh, 1994) and providing consulting services on the efficient and effective use of 
resources (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Yee et al., 2008). By doing so, IA can help management 
to increase ROCE in businesses and enhance efficiency and effectiveness in public sector 
organisations as well. 
From the Marxist perspective, therefore, IA arguably serves a useful function by helping 
maximise ROCE as well as enabling a society to achieve socially desirable goals such as 
mitigated fraud and corruption, and reduced wastage and devaluation of capital. In the 
developing country context, IA can contribute to poverty reduction and improved living 
standards by limiting the wastage of capital (and surplus‐value) from fraud, inefficiency, 
corruption or theft. Yee et al. (2008) argue, from a predominantly Marxist economic theory 
perspective, in their empirical study of the role and effectiveness of IA in Singapore that 
internal audit is important in the prevention of wastage and devaluation of capital from fraud, 
corruption, and inefficiency. Capital that wastes is unable to earn the required ROCE. Marx 
commented in Volume 3 of Capital (Marx, 1981) that, in the competitive struggle between 
rival capitalist firms, efficient businesses will see their capital maintained in times of crisis 
whilst inefficient businesses will see their capital waste or devalue either in whole or in part. 
As Marx (1981, pp. 360‐2) writes, due to equilibrating mechanisms in the economy, 
profitability is effectively “spread around” across firms. By contrast, if a firm suffers and dies 
it dies alone. Internal auditing, therefore, could assist a firm to remain competitive and 
maintain or increase its capital. At a societal level, strong IA, through its consulting services 
to management, arguably allows a society to channel capital into areas where it can yield an 
acceptable rate of return rather than into areas where it will waste or devalue. IA then has 
macroeconomic as well as social justice implications that the existing literature, with its 
narrow agency‐theory (single firm) focus, has generally failed to appreciate. 
In contrast to Bryer's (1999a, b, 2006) view, Alawattage and Wickramasinghe's (2008) study 
of a Sri Lankan tea plantation illustrates that cultural and political hegemony is more 
important than accounting in labour process control. Similarly, Ezzamel et al. (2007), using 
China as a case in point, indicate that the mode of production influences accounting's role. 
These contrasting observations suggest that the role and effectiveness of IA could vary across 
settings. It also provides part of the justification to consider triangulation of theories. 
Linking institutional theory and Marx's theory 
The use of the two theories in combination enables considering social aspects of 
organisational dynamics as assumed by Barley and Tolbert (1997), and the economic 
dimensions of organisational phenomena. In this paper, while Marx's theory is mainly 
employed to understand economic motives for organisational phenomena, institutional theory 
informs the analysis of social aspects of organisational dynamics. Therefore, it is necessary to 
assess the compatibility of the two theories when used in combination. These theories 
originated from political economics and thus share similar foundations. This origin enables a 
study of organisational phenomena as embedded in broad social, political, and economic 
settings (Deegan, 2006; Hardy et al., 2007). The Marxist approach is also considered one of 
the origins of institutional theory (Scott, 2004). Beyond this general similarity of the two 
theories, the rationale for employing the two theories in combination[1] is that they reinforce 
one another's arguments. 
Marx's approach as used in this paper emphasises the economic aspects of organisational 
phenomena without ruling out the impact of social and institutional forces (Bryer, 2000). At a 
societal level, Marx (cited in Harman, 1998, p. 9) states that the pursuit of surplus‐value 
made the feudal mode of production to give way to semi‐capitalist forms and semi‐capitalism 
to fully fledged capitalism. Marx, cited in Harman (1998, p. 9) stated: 
In acquiring new productive forces, men [sic] change their mode of production; and in 
changing their mode of production, in changing their way of earning a living, they change 
all their social relations. The handmill gives society with a feudal lord; the steam mill 
society with an industrial capitalist. 
The quote suggests the importance of historical and social perspectives in understanding 
organisational phenomena. In addition to this general view of Marx on changes at societal 
level, his view on a capitalist organisation focuses on organisation level dynamics. The 
micro‐economic view of Marx does not preclude social and cultural determinations on 
organisations (Foley, 1986). As Foley (1986, p. 1) explains: 
[…] the phenomena he [Marx] discusses cannot be understood independent of the history 
that produced them. This approach contrasts with the view that phenomena will tend to 
reassert themselves regardless of historical context. He sees the relations he is studying as 
being in a constant process of change, not just unchanging elements undergoing some 
rearrangement. Thus, Marx's aim is not to state universal principles that explain human 
and social interaction once and for all but to understand the regularities that govern the 
changes in specific social formations. 
As the quote explains, Marx's approach considers the importance of historical and social 
aspects to changes in organisational phenomena. Similarly, institutional theory underscores 
the importance of historical and social dynamics in shaping institutions (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997). To appreciate the link between institutional theory and Marx's theory, it is necessary 
to understand the relationship between the ideas of “young” and “mature” Marx. Mature 
Marx's views are mostly interpreted as deterministic and those of young Marx are mostly 
interpreted as having a social aspect (Foley, 1986). This line of thought owes much to French 
Communist Party theoretician Louis Althusser (2005, pp. 13, 33), who argued that an 
“epistemological break” around 1845‐1846 separates Marx's earlier “ideological” work from 
his later “scientific” work (Leung and James, 2010, p. 108). However, Foley 
(1986) and Ollman (1976) argue that Marx's thoughts need to be seen as one corpus rather 
than as having this kind of distinction. For example, the young Marx's early theory of 
alienation is subsumed within, rather than negated by, his later theory of surplus‐value even 
though the term “alienation” is not used by the mature Marx (Leung and James, 2010, p. 
109). Therefore, Marx's theory of the circuit of industrial capital is considered in this paper as 
having both economic and social dimensions (Avineri, 1971) although the theory relates to 
the works of the mature Marx. 
The concept of institution as applied in institutional theory refers to an “organisational field”, 
which comprises several organisations or industries. Thus, it could be argued that while 
Marx's thinking on society focuses on changes in society at large, institutional theory 
concerns changes in parts of society as well. Despite a dominant focus on cultural aspects, 
institutional theory also recognises the importance of efficiency motives causing 
institutionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 94) 
maintain: 
[…] institutional theorists acknowledge that cultural constraints do not completely 
determine human action […] Rather, institutions set bounds on rationality by restricting 
the opportunities and alternatives we perceive and, thereby, increase the probability of 
certain types of behaviour. However, just as perfect rationality is rare, so too is completely 
bounded rationality. Through choice and action, individuals and organisations can 
deliberately modify, and even eliminate, institutions. 
Owners of capitalist firms determine the goals of their organisations, this goal being creating 
surplus‐value. Marx's theory can inform this rational aspect of organisational phenomena, 
without precluding the impact of social determinations (Bryer, 2000, p. 453). While owners 
are a group of actors, there are other actors (for example, employees, government, the 
management, and other components of society) that influence the structures and practices of 
organisations. Thus a theoretical perspective that combines Marx's theory and institutional 
theory arguably enables a holistic understanding of internal audit as part of organisational 
systems and illuminates the link between internal audit and organisational goal achievement. 
Employing a combination of the two theories in a theoretical framework is beginning to 
appear in empirical research. For example,Vidal (2009) employed this approach to study 
institutionalisation of lean production in US manufacturing firms. As Vidal (2009, p. 1) 
maintains: 
The manufacturing environment is constituted by interwoven technical and institutional 
pressures, as well as embedded organisational relations that generate institutional space 
for variation in organisational performance. Inside the factory, managers, who must 
strategically interpret and react to multiple environmental pressures, seek to alter 
workforce routines in pursuit of operational goals and ultimately to extract labour effort 
sufficient to achieve a satisfactory profit rate. 
Vidal argues that the pursuit of surplus‐value underlies the institutionalisation process in 
competitive environments. This notion implies that institutional and Marxist theory 
arguments can inform studies of organisational phenomena. With this understanding, the 
present paper employs these theories to develop propositions on antecedents and 
organisational performance implications of IA effectiveness. 
Literature review and propositions 
The role and effectiveness of internal audit 
The role of internal audit has been transforming along with changes in its 
environment. McNamee and McNamee (1995) sketch three major phases of transformation in 
the history of IA. Pre 1940s, IA was mainly focused on checking propriety of transaction and 
records. In the 1940s, the development of information economy based on the concept of 
systems caused the emergence of modern IA with a systems evaluation approach. In this 
phase, IA has been concerned with checking compliance with policies and procedures. Then, 
since the 1990s, another wave of transformation led IA to be viewed as a value‐adding 
service with a broader scope of activities including assisting organisations in the management 
of risk. 
Similarly, Spira and Page (2003) explain contemporary IA's shift in emphasis as a result of 
pressures on organisations. They argue that these pressures caused changes in responsibilities 
of boards of directors, management, and external auditors. Various corporate governance 
initiatives in the USA and the UK brought about a change in the meaning of internal control 
to incorporate the management of risk. For example, Committee of Sponsoring Organisations 
(COSO) framework's definition considers internal control as aiming to provide assurance 
regarding efficiency and effectiveness of operations, reliability of financial reports, and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 
1992). Such changes created opportunities for IA to provide consulting services to 
management and assist boards of directors to manage risk. 
Furthermore, the meaning of risk has evolved and the scope of internal control has broadened 
to incorporate the aim of achieving organisational efficiency and effectiveness. The shift in 
top management responsibility about internal control from compliance with policies to a 
focus on important risks put IA at advantage. Management took responsibilities for internal 
control systems and board of directors” responsibility expanded to incorporate organisational 
prosperity as well as accountability to shareholders. This gave internal auditors advantage 
over external auditors. As a result, IA grew a pre‐eminent position as advisers to the board of 
directors although the tension remains between the consulting role of IA and the need for IA 
independence (Spira and Page, 2003). 
Internal auditors' endeavours toward professionalisation, under the leadership of the IIA, 
could also have helped redefine the scope of IA as necessary (McNamee and McNamee, 
1995). This endeavour could further be seen in the lens of inter profession competition of IA 
with external auditing (Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001). External auditors change in focus 
from a systems approach to a business risk approach coupled with their attempts to provide 
IA services on the one hand and societal pressure for external audit independence (following 
high profile corporate failures) on the other hand made IA an alternative mechanism to enter 
into the consulting arena (Spira and Page, 2003). 
The Institute of Internal Auditors' (2004) latest definition of internal auditing claims the 
broad scope and value‐adding focus of the function. The definition and other literature (for 
example, Davidson et al., 2005) also present both assurance and consulting activities as key 
components of the IA function. Similarly, Al‐Twaijry et al. (2003) and Albrecht et 
al. (1988) explain that IA can be of benefit to organisations by ensuring compliance to 
policies, rules, and regulations, which are largely of a financial nature, and by working in 
partnership with management to help improve operations and manage risk. Although the 
value‐adding notion of IA presumes that IA is usually effective, this is never guaranteed. In 
fact the literature suggests that IA effectiveness tends to be influenced by the contextual 
dynamics within which internal audit is practiced. 
The literature also indicates contemporary IA's emphasis on a consulting approach as 
compared to “traditional” IA, which has largely been assurance‐oriented (Bou‐Raad, 
2000; Goodwin, 2004; Roth, 2000, 2002; Yee et al., 2008). The assurance focus of internal 
audit promotes IA independence from management. On the other hand, the consulting 
paradigm advocates the notion that IA operates as a partner of management. Cooper et 
al. (2006) reviewed the Asia Pacific IA literature and concluded internal audit is shifting 
towards a consulting orientation in this region. Similarly, a review of European IA literature 
by Allegrini et al. (2006) and a similar work on the American IA literature by Hass et 
al. (2006) generally confirm this paradigm shift. Despite the general undercurrent about this 
paradigm shift, nevertheless, the empirical literature provides mixed results on IA's dominant 
focus. 
For example, Hass et al. (2006) observed, although IA has generally shifted to a consulting 
approach, it tended to re‐emphasise compliance audit following the enactment of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) (Congress of the United States of America, 2002). Also,Roth 
(2000, 2002) and Yee et al. (2008) documented evidence of a consulting approach to IA in 
North American and Singaporean organisations respectively. Yee et al. (2008) attribute their 
results to the Western‐styled corporate sector and the well‐developed external auditing 
profession in Singapore. Similarly, Allegrini et al. (2006) highlighted that IA was assurance‐
focused in some European countries. Furthermore, surveys of IA in Saudi Arabia (Al‐
Twaijry et al., 2003) and Belgium (Institute of Internal Auditors Belgium, 2006, cited 
in Allegrini et al. 2006) reported dominance of the assurance audit paradigm. 
Al‐Twaijry et al. (2003) consider compliance with the Standards for Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditors (SPPIA) as an indicator of value adding IA. They explored IA practices of 
Saudi Arabian companies from an institutional theory perspective, taking a sample of 135 
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. They used questionnaires and interviews to 
assess the extent of compliance of IA practices with SPPIA and found that there was a low 
level of IA effectiveness and value‐added in Saudi Arabia. IA was mainly focused on 
checking reliability of financial record keeping and information, compliance with rules and 
regulations, and evaluation and examination of internal controls. The study found low levels 
of auditee cooperation in Saudi Arabian companies, particularly when the audit scope 
extended beyond the traditional areas. The authors argue that this situation led to low levels 
of implementation of IA recommendations. The study's results further suggest that internal 
audit may be sometimes decoupled in that the function may not operate in compliance with 
SPPIA despite stakeholders” expectations of compliance. In addition, they noted that the 
establishment of the IIA chapter in Saudi Arabia provided a normative isomorphic pressure 
for the development of IA in the country. 
Similarly, Arena et al. (2006) and Arena and Azzone (2007) employed institutional theory for 
a study of IA in Italian companies. Arenaet al. (2006) focus on the coercive isomorphic 
pressure of stock exchange regulations influencing the development of IA. They describe and 
explain IA characteristics, activities, and levels of reporting in the context of the institutional 
settings in which companies operate. Specifically, they draw on recent developments in 
corporate governance requirements for listed companies in the contexts of USA, UK, and 
Italian stock exchanges. They characterise the regulations of SOA of the USA, the Turnbull 
Report of UK, and Italian regulations (namely, the Draghi's law, the Preda Code, and 
legislative decree number 231/2001). The authors observed variations in the three 
institutional settings pertaining to the degree of cooperation between the management and IA; 
influence from market competition; influence from professional bodies and consultants; and 
IIA's role in promoting the profession. 
Arena et al. (2006) point out that institutional pressure on companies leads IA to take on a 
particular audit focus. They show that coercive pressures led IA to a financial audit focus and 
argue that the stock exchange rules and regulations substantially impacted on the 
development of IA in Italy. The authors identified three categories of firms they studied. In 
the first category were companies without internal audit as a stand‐alone function. For this 
category, listing rules did not require having a separate IA function. The second category 
comprised companies with formal IA departments that mainly focused on compliance audits. 
Thus, in these organisations, IA was adopted as a result of institutional pressures. In category 
three, more focus was afforded to risk assessment and consulting. Nevertheless, assurance 
and financial audit were also within the domain of IA's services. Reasons for IA adoption in 
these companies went beyond a mere response to institutional pressures. In addition to 
meeting regulatory requirements, internal control assessments were aimed to improve 
processes and add value. There were frequent interactions of IA with audit committees; IA 
departments also reported to boards of directors and audit committees. In addition, audit 
committees tended to require further investigations on specific issues following IA 
findings. Arena et al.'s (2006) findings are consistent with that of Carcello et al. (2002)which 
suggests that IA plays a prominent role in the internal control structures of organisations in 
regulated industries. 
From a slightly different perspective, Yee et al. (2008) examined the role and effectiveness of 
IA in Singapore. They studied the perception of Singaporean managers on IA practice. 
Specifically, they identified whether IA is viewed as a partner with management or as a 
watchdog for routine compliance mechanisms. The authors argue that the importance of IA in 
organisations is increasing, and that the function can play a value‐adding role in modern 
organisations by expanding its scope of services to embrace operational areas. In contrast 
to Al‐Twaijry et al.'s (2003) findings, Yee et al. (2008) found that Singaporean managers at 
the senior‐level (but not mid‐level managers) were generally satisfied with the proficiency 
and services of internal auditors. The authors link their findings with Singapore having a 
well‐developed corporate sector and a strong external auditing profession. Thus the resulting 
experience and competence of Singaporean internal auditors means that they are better able 
to serve in a value‐adding capacity than those in Saudi Arabia. Yee et al. (2008) maintain that 
Marx's framework explains how IA can assist management to meet its accountability to 
investors. The management is accountable for increasing ROCE and IA not only assists 
management by enhancing timeliness and accuracy of reporting this rate, but also by helping 
increase this rate. The dissatisfaction of mid‐level managers in this study is interesting. It 
could be due to the recommendations of IA being “pushed through” in an authoritarian 
manner and/or recommendations not fully understanding work‐life realities on the factory 
floor. 
Conclusions on the dominant or ideal focus of IA cannot be drawn from the exiting limited 
literature. This is because the scope of prior studies, except for Roth (2000, 2002) and Yee et 
al. (2008), is restricted to private sector companies. Also, the studies were not aimed at 
explaining variations in IA's dominant orientation – and possibly in IA effectiveness. The 
evidence from the literature, nevertheless, suggests that IA effectiveness is possibly 
influenced by the context in which IA operates. Results of recent studies (for 
example, Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2009; Mihret and Woldeyohannis, 
2008; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007) consolidate this notion of the possible context‐dependence 
of IA effectiveness. Mihret and Woldeyohannis (2008) examined IA in an Ethiopian state‐
owned enterprise to identify factors that determine the value adding attributes of internal 
audit. They underscore that organisational goals and strategies and the level of risk exposure 
of organisations tend to shape the dominant focus of IA as either assurance or 
consulting. Mihret and Yismaw's (2007) study in the same country context as Mihret and 
Woldeyohannis' (2008) study indicates management support and internal audit quality as the 
major determinants of IA effectiveness. 
The view of Albrecht et al. (1988) appears to explain differences in IA focus and suggests the 
context‐dependence of IA's value adding orientation. They conducted a study to identify 
factors that make IA to be perceived as effective by managers, IA directors, boards of 
directors, and external auditors. The study involved 13 best internal audit departments in the 
USA identified by the IIA. The results indicate that corporate environment, top management 
support, quality of internal auditors, and quality of IA work characterise effective IA. 
However, this result should also be interpreted in view of the results of Yee et al. (2008), 
which suggest that satisfaction with IA is likely to vary according to the level of management 
and there can be cultural tension in organisations between commercial and production 
worldviews. 
Albrecht et al. (1988) stress the widening scope of IA to embrace a consulting role instead of 
a total de‐emphasis of financial and compliance audit. They comment (Albrecht et al., 1988, 
p. 3) that IA may be perceived as effective in both the consulting and traditional financial 
audit roles: 
[...] At the onset of the project, the researchers anticipated that the roles of internal 
auditing could be conveniently grouped into “types” of audits performed, i.e., financial, 
operational, EDP, compliance or performance audits. Moreover, the researchers assumed 
that highly effective audit functions would concentrate their efforts in their operational or 
performance audits, because these would benefit the company most. This proved 
fallacious. In fact, quite the contrary was true. In several of the companies reviewed, the 
audit departments were strictly financial audits, yet were evaluated as being very effective. 
The conclusion is that the critical issue is not the type of audit work performed, but rather 
that the audit work is completely consistent with the objectives and role as determined by 
top management and the audit committee. 
This quote suggests that IA is considered effective when it is value adding regardless of 
whether its role is assurance or consulting oriented. This notion is supported by other 
literature (for example, Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006) and is consistent with the 
IIA's (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004) definition of internal auditing. The definition 
embodies both consulting and assurance services of IA and stresses the necessity of IA's 
value adding role as well as its contribution to accomplishment of organisational objectives. 
Therefore, it appears reasonable to consider that effective IA is characterised to a larger 
extent by a broad scope of services than a de‐emphasis of financial and compliance audits. 
Under this broader scope, IA assists management in the management of risk and conducts 
operational, traditional financial, and compliance audits (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Albrecht et 
al., 1988). 
Overall, it is apparent from the literature that IA is considered value adding when it is 
effective. The literature however indicates that there exist few generally accepted approaches 
to assess IA effectiveness as yet. Arena and Azzone (2009) summarise three approaches 
employed in the extant literature to evaluate IA effectiveness as: 
1. those using the level of implementation of internal audit recommendations; 
2. output or outcome measures (using opinions of internal audit customers, for example 
management); and 
3. process measures (compliance with Statements for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing (SPPIA)). 
Under the first approach, Mihret and Woldeyohannis (2008) compared IA reports of two 
periods to identify IA findings that were not repeated. They considered the percentage of 
non‐repeated findings to total audit findings of an earlier audit period as a measure of 
implementation of IA findings, which they employed as an indicator of IA effectiveness. 
Similarly, Arena and Azzone (2009) used a four‐point scale to measure the extent of 
implementation of IA recommendations as an indicator of IA effectiveness. Arena and 
Azzone indicate as a limitation of this approach that it does not consider the type and quality 
of IA services provided. That is, the approach assumes that all audit findings are equally 
significant and that the service offer of IA is complete. In addition, when it is employed as 
in Mihret and Woldeyohannis (2008), it assumes that the audit findings that are not repeated 
in subsequent audit reports are implemented; however, this may not necessarily be the case. It 
could be that some recommendations simply prove too unpopular, costly or impractical to 
implement and are then quietly shelved and forgotten about. The second approach has a 
conceptual merit of considering IA's customers. This is a considerable advantage especially 
given that IA is expected to be customer‐oriented. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
operationalise this approach because backgrounds and experiences of IA's customers are 
apparently diverse (Arena and Azzone, 2009). 
Under the third approach, Al‐Twaijry et al. (2003) employed compliance with SPPIA as an 
indicator of IA effectiveness. This approach, which is adopted for the present paper, possibly 
offers a more comprehensive set of IA effectiveness indicators. It also relates to the 
normative standards (IIA standards) that internal auditors are supposed to follow. SPPIA 
compliance arguably provides the best approach to measure IA effectiveness because it helps 
to examine IA systems and processes. This approach also helps to take into account the multi‐
dimensional nature of IA effectiveness, which appears to be lacking in the existing internal 
audit literature. That is, it helps measure IA effectiveness from several dimensions rather than 
using a single proxy measure. The literature on these measures is discussed in what follows. 
Major prior studies on IA effectiveness are summarised in Table I. 
Independence and objectivity 
Raghunandan and Mchugh (1994) consider IA effectiveness as a function of independence 
and objectivity. Objectivity is considered essential for internal auditors' proper discharge of 
responsibilities (Christopher et al., 2009). Internal audit's independence from the units being 
audited has been regarded as a surrogate for objectivity. The IIA stresses this need for 
independence when it recommends that the IA function report to the highest level of authority 
in the organisation (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004). Mat Zain et al. (2006) point out that 
audit committees could enhance IA effectiveness. Reporting to and having frequent meetings 
with audit committees contribute to internal auditors” objectivity (Cohen et al., 
2004; Goodwin and Yeob, 2001; Mat Zain and Subramaniam, 2007; Raghunandan and 
Mchugh, 1994; Scarbrough et al., 1998). Mat Zain et al.'s study also indicates that audit 
committees assist in enhancing management action on IA recommendations. Similarly, based 
on a study of Singaporean companies,Goodwin and Yeob (2001) suggest that IA interaction 
with audit committee enhances IA independence and objectivity. Furthermore, they find that 
organisational size is associated with independence and objectivity. 
Internal auditors' objectivity is also enhanced when a board retains the authority to hire and 
fire an IA director (Raghunandan and Mchugh, 1994) and when it reviews IA's plans and 
performance (Scarbrough et al., 1998). Thus, although complete independence is literally 
impossible because internal auditors are organisational employees, an independent frame of 
mind is essential. This should manifest itself in IA's ability to make the “tough” 
recommendations without fear or favour. 
Another substantial body of literature concerning the relationship between IA and the board 
of directors also explains internal audit's corporate governance role. Gramling et al. (2004, p. 
194) underscore the importance of IA in enhancing quality of corporate governance. They 
view IA as a cornerstone of corporate governance that “serves as a resource to each of the 
other three parties[2]responsible for corporate governance” (Gramling et al., 2004, p. 
194). Gramling et al. (2004) consider IA quality as a measure of the value of this resource. 
Similarly, Cohen et al. (2004) explain IA's essential position in corporate governance. 
Furthermore, other literature (for example, Antoine, 2004; Carey et al., 2006; Christopher et 
al., 2009) indicates that the enactment of the SOA following the major financial reporting 
scandals affirmed the importance of IA in corporate governance. Independent and objective 
IA could help enhance quality of reported earnings (Cohen et al., 2004, 2002; Gramling et 
al., 2004) and possibly minimise earnings management (Davidson et al., 2005). 
Under the SOA, New York Stock Exchange listed companies are required to maintain IA that 
provides assistance to the audit committee in risk management and ensuring sound internal 
control (Gramling et al., 2004). IA contributes to financial reporting quality and fraud 
prevention (Beasley et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2004). Independence of the IA director from 
management determines the nature of IA work and its corporate governance role (Miguel and 
Govindarajan, 1984). Furthermore, from Marx's (1981)perspective, internal auditing helps 
prevent capital from remaining in loss‐making areas and assists in detecting fraud (Yee et al., 
2008). 
IA proficiency 
The IIA's Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (1210‐Proficiency), 
require that internal auditors possess the knowledge, skills and competencies needed to 
conduct an audit (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008). Technical competence and continuous 
training are considered essential for effective IA. Consistent with this thinking, Gramling and 
Meyers (1997) find that certification of internal auditors is perceived as an indicator of IA's 
competence. Also, Al‐Twaijry et al. (2003) argue that internal auditors could not have power 
unless they possess the necessary competencies. Given the broad scope of contemporary IA, 
an IA department should employ internal auditors with a variety of skills to be able to 
undertake audits beyond the audit of financial activities (Flesher and Zanzig, 2000). 
Furthermore, Butt (1988) and Libby and Frederick (1990) suggest the importance of auditor 
experience in enhancing auditors' knowledge. Similarly, Bonner and Lewis (1990) consider 
years of experience as an indicator of auditors' knowledge and expertise. Although these 
authors focused on external audit, the concept of expertise applies equally to internal 
auditors. This is because internal and external audit share a common body of knowledge and 
largely possess similar competencies (Krishnamoorthy, 2001). 
Scope of work and performance 
The scope and quality of work is another important factor that reflects IA effectiveness. 
Specifically, the sufficiency of internal audit's scope of work and the standard with which the 
audits are planned, executed and reported are important illustrations of effective IA (Al‐
Twaijry et al., 2003; Albrecht et al., 1988). 
Antecedents of IA effectiveness 
The variations in empirical research results pertaining to the dominant focus of internal audit 
– highlighted in the preceding section – may arguably be explained by differences in context 
factors grounded in the environments in which the empirical evidence was produced. 
Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983) it is logical to argue that internal audit's role and 
effectiveness is possibly associated with the isomorphic pressures that could shape IA 
practices. Hass et al.'s (2006) review of the American internal auditing literature supports this 
claim. They point out that the issuance of the SOA (2002) engendered internal audit's re‐
emphasis on assurance services. Consistent with this notion, Arena et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that in companies to which strict regulations apply, greater focus tends to be 
accorded to compliance audit. A key insight here is that both assurance and consulting 
approaches could arguably be considered value adding depending on the context (Roth, 
2002). Nonetheless, few detailed studies of the role and effectiveness of IA with inter‐sector 
comparisons have been conducted as yet to explore variables associated with variations 
across organisations. 
Goodwin (2004) compared IA in public and private sector organisations in Australia and 
New Zealand. She reported that IA's status and the tendency to outsource IA are higher in the 
public sector. Goodwin found little differences in IA activities and the extent of IA 
interaction with external auditors. She attributes the observed similarities in IA practices to 
the similarity of contexts in the two sectors resulting from public sector reforms in the two 
countries. This suggests the need for researching related issues in different settings – where 
the two sectors exhibit variations. Studies in such other settings arguably help identify 
country‐ and organisation‐level contextual factors that possibly influence IA effectiveness. 
Organisational category 
The objectives, operating practices and stakeholders of organisations in different sectors 
could vary because different institutional pressures may apply in different sectors. For 
example, Jacobs (1998) suggests that value for money audit is influenced by institutional 
context. The type of business in which a company is engaged may also influence the type of 
internal control and the extent and type of professional advice that IA provides to 
management (Roth, 2002). As a result, the services required from internal auditors may differ 
by type of business. Goodwin (2003) highlights some differences in the relationship between 
IA and audit committees across sectors. Propensity to outsource IA and all the resulting 
issues are also likely to vary by sector (Goodwin, 2004). 
Company size 
As the size of an organisation increases, the complexity of the necessary organisational 
controls as well as the regulatory requirements imposed on it are also likely to increase. 
Increased complexity and regulation may mean greater demands from internal audit 
regarding IA's services relating to the control systems of organisations (Arena et al., 2006). 
Consistent with this notion,Carcello et al. (2002) find that audit committees are likely to 
make reviews of IA results in large companies. They also note that large companies are likely 
to allocate more resources to IA activity. 
Similarly, Goodwin and Yeob (2001) suggest that organisational size is associated with the 
variables that could impact on IA independence and objectivity. Furthermore, Raghunandan 
and Mchugh (1994) point out that company size is positively associated with the strength of 
internal control systems. Increased company size is also sometimes associated with a 
propensity to outsource IA to external auditors (Carey et al., 2006). Moreover, company size 
is related to risk and it has been employed as a proxy to measure risk (Cheng and McNamara, 
2000). 
Risk exposure 
Felix et al. (2001) find that availability of IA in an organisation depends on the level of risk. 
When organisations are exposed to high risk, management's demand for IA in the 
management of risk may be greater. IA's focus on risk management in turn enables it to align 
its plans with organisational goals and strategies (Selim and McNamee, 1999). As different 
organisations may be exposed to different levels of risk, the demand for IA services may vary 
accordingly (Arena et al., 2006). Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent's (2006)hypothesis of a positive 
association between business complexity and existence of IA in an organisation could also 
suggest that the level of risk in an organisation may influence IA practices. 
Likewise, Allegrini and D'Onza (2003) examined risk assessment and IA in Italian 
organisations and find variations in IA approaches among organisations. 
Management support, auditee cooperation, and organisational policy 
Management support to IA is considered as a determinant of IA effectiveness (Mihret and 
Yismaw, 2007). This support could, for instance, be by allocating adequate human and 
material resources to IA. It could also be by setting the overall tone in organisations that 
determines the level of cooperation of auditees to IA. The level of auditee cooperation in turn 
influences the extent to which IA properly accomplishes its objectives (Al‐Twaijry et al., 
2003; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007). Organisational policy authorising IA (for example, IA 
charter) is another potential influence that is closely related to management support and 
auditee cooperation (Mihret and Yismaw, 2007). The management also sets the overall policy 
setting that enables IA to garner authority in the organisation and thus gain auditees” 
acceptance. 
Internal and external audit linkages 
External audit impacts on the development of IA. Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001) analysed 
the dynamics underlying the issue of internalisation versus externalisation of IA. They argue 
that external audit and IA engage in volitional behaviour, which leads each profession to 
redefine its roles to encompass IA activities. The authors illustrated this notion with the 
AICPA's view of CPA firms providing IA services to their clients and the IIA's reaction by 
promoting the maintenance of the service in‐house. This suggests that external auditors' 
interest to provide IA services impels the IA profession to improve its services with a view to 
preserving a separate professional status. This maps onto the argument that external audit 
provides a normative isomorphic pressure for the development of IA. 
Furthermore, external audit assists the development of IA by serving as a market for 
recruitment of internal auditors (Al‐Twaijry et al., 2003; Albrecht et al., 1988; Arena et al., 
2006). Also, companies could establish IA by initially outsourcing the function to external 
auditors (Carey et al., 2006). On the other hand, where organisations prefer to outsource IA 
services to their external auditors, establishment of IA could be delayed or its development 
attenuated. For instance, Yee et al. (2008) find that some Singaporean organisations did not 
establish IA because of reliance upon external auditors. The SOA banned non‐audit services 
by external auditors (Quick and Warming‐Rasmussen, 2005) and severely restricted internal 
audit outsourcing to external auditors (Abbott et al., 2005). This restriction could necessitate 
launching IA in‐house. Furthermore, to determine the extent of their reliance on IA work, 
external auditors assess IA effectiveness. This reliance is also an area where IA adds value to 
organisations through reduced external audit fees (Krishnamoorthy, 2001, 2002; Morrill and 
Morrill, 2003). IA may therefore gain some feedback and improve its effectiveness when 
internal and external audit linkages are strong. This could be another possible normative 
pressure for internal audit's development. 
In sum, it is apparent from the literature that context factors have the potential to shape IA 
practices. The literature has largely examined how these factors influence IA adoption. A 
logical step forward could be to see the implications of these factors and their interplay in 
shaping the extent of internal audit effectiveness. Therefore, consistent with institutional 
theory arguments, the following propositions are worth pursuing (the first part of Figure 
1 shows these relationships between the propositions): 
P1. The pattern of contextual antecedents and the interplay among them shape the extent of 
internal audit effectiveness. 
P1a. Internal audit effectiveness differs in a systematic way between public sector and 
private‐sector organisations. 
P1b. Managers of organisations that are exposed to high risk will greatly seek the support of 
internal audit and thus establish effective internal audit departments. 
P1c. Managers of large organisations will appreciate the support of internal audit in 
managing the complex setting and thus establish effective internal audit departments. 
P1d. The attributes of the linkage between internal and external audit can promote or 
constrain internal audit effectiveness. 
Internal audit effectiveness and organisational performance 
Effective IA is expected to help organisations achieve objectives (Dittenhofer, 2001). The 
IIA's (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004) definition also states that IA “helps an organisation 
accomplish its objectives”. Similarly, IA's role in organisational goal achievement has been 
recognised in other literature (see for example, Gramling et al., 2004; Hass et al., 2006; Roth, 
2003; Yee et al., 2008). Because assisting organisations to achieve objectives is apparently a 
central rationale for the existence of IA, examining the linkage between IA and organisational 
performance could be an alternate way of assessing IA effectiveness. Consistent with this 
notion,Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003) called for research on the relationship between IA 
effectiveness and organisational performance. This possible nexus between IA effectiveness 
and performance of companies might be explained by employing Marx's (1978) theory of the 
circuit of industrial capital, which is outlined in section two of this paper. 
As argued previously, following Bryer (1999a, b, 2006) and Yee et al. (2008), Marx's 
(1978) theory of the circuit of industrial capital explains investors' pursuit of “surplus‐value” 
from capital and the role of control mechanisms designed to guarantee and further the 
achievement of that end. The theory illuminates the concept of value and arguably serves to 
explain internal audit's role in organisations not only as a compliance‐based control 
mechanism, but also as a forward‐looking, value‐adding service. Thus, increase in the ROCE 
is used as an indicator of internal audit effectiveness. IA can assist in enhancing the quality of 
ROCE reported (Cohen et al., 2004, 2002; Gramling et al., 2004) and help increase this rate 
through its operational auditing, assisting in risk management (Spira and Page, 2003), and 
preventing wastage of capital by deterring fraud (Coram et al., 2008; Raghunandan and 
Mchugh, 1994; Yee et al., 2008). By helping improve economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
and providing consulting services on the efficient and effective use of resources (Al‐
Twaijry et al., 2003; Yee et al., 2008), IA could play a value‐adding role in public sector 
organisations as well. In addition, internal audit possesses the authority to report about 
management to the board of directors to enhance accountability of the former (Gramling et 
al., 2004; Yee et al., 2008). 
Following the general undercurrent in the limited literature in this area and from the 
perspective of Marx's (1978) theory of the circuit of industrial capital, the following 
proposition is worth pursuing (Figure 1): 
P2. Organisations that have effective internal audit will exhibit greater achievement of 
organisational objectives. 
IA cannot be regarded as having completed its role unless its findings and recommendations 
are implemented (Sawyer, 1995). Therefore, management action on IA recommendations is 
considered vital for internal audit's contribution to organisational performance (Raghunandan 
and Mchugh, 1994). Consequently, management support for IA is considered essential to 
enhance IA's role in organisational goal attainment (Albrecht et al., 1988; Rittenberg and 
Covaleski, 2001). Thus the following proposition is worth pursuing. 
P3. Management's action on internal audit recommendations enhances the positive 
contribution of effective internal audit to organisational goal achievement. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to study how internal audit was used in the communist era in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and how effective IA (even if it was not called 
by that name) related to Communist‐era measures of performance/ achievement. 
Discussion and research agenda 
This paper argues that the dynamics in an internal audit setting influence IA effectiveness and 
that effective IA could be positively associated with organisational performance. The existing 
literature shows that: 
• although some prior studies have considered some contextual influences in isolation, a 
complete set of contextual antecedents of IA effectiveness and their possible 
interactions has not been fully explored; 
• the limited literature largely focused on private sector companies in developed 
economies; and 
• measures and theoretical bases of various concepts related to IA effectiveness, its 
antecedents, and contribution to organisational performance are not consistent or are 
at times not clearly identified. 
Thus, this paper has developed research propositions based on an approach that combines 
institutional theory and Marx's theory of the circuit of industrial capital. While institutional 
theory is employed to identify potential contextual antecedents of IA effectiveness, Marx's 
theory of the circuit of industrial capital is used to illuminate IA as a value‐adding activity. 
We emphasise the need to empirically examine IA effectiveness, within the suggested 
theoretical framework, to identify its potential contextual antecedents by further developing 
the propositions offered in this paper into research hypotheses. Examining the factors that 
influence IA effectiveness and the possible interactions among them is likely to bear fruit. 
This is because, as it is apparent from the literature, the contextual antecedents appear 
interrelated. Thus, the first proposition and the sub‐propositions could be used as a starting 
point to formulate testable hypotheses. These propositions could also serve as a basis to 
develop research questions for more detailed qualitative inquiry. Such descriptive and 
explanatory studies would ultimately enable deeper understanding of IA practice and theory 
in relation to the “what” and “why” of IA practice. This understanding could help predict the 
direction of further developments of IA theory and practice. 
Results of future research under such a paradigm are also expected to inform professional 
associations of IA to identify the focal point in their endeavours to design strategies for the 
development of the profession. Understanding of the motives for the establishment of IA 
departments, identification of the contextual forces that determine the focus of IA practice 
and understanding of the values that organisations seek to realise from investments in IA 
would help develop pragmatic approaches to further promote the recognition of the 
profession in contemporary organisational milieu. Institutional theory explanation for the 
formation of IA could enable deeper understanding of the types of services that management 
is likely to seek from IA. Specifically, the theory can help explicate the motives of 
management that lead to establishment of IA. 
Although some literature (for example, Gramling et al., 2004; Institute of Internal Auditors, 
2004) indicates internal audit's expected contribution to organisational goal achievement, this 
notion has not been empirically examined as yet. The present paper has argued that empirical 
examination of this notion would serve as an additional approach to assess IA effectiveness 
because assisting organisations to meet objectives appears a central rationale for the existence 
of IA. Therefore, P2 and P3 are expected to play a useful role by initiating this examination 
to see whether IA has reached a stage of development where its profile reflects on the extent 
of organisational goal achievement. 
Such a study will help understand whether the current definition of IA and standards of 
professional practice exhibit empirical significance. Thus, P2 is a typically suitable starting 
point to formulate a hypothesis in a quantitative study. Using proxies for performance such as 
ROCE, a positive association between IA effectiveness and company performance could be 
empirically tested. Such a study could also be conducted in public and other not‐for‐profit 
organisations by identifying appropriate measures of performance. The contribution of IA to 
performance of companies is expected to be determined by the extent to which management 
takes action based on internal auditors' recommendations. Therefore, studies examining the 
association of IA effectiveness with company performance need to consider the level of 
management's actions on IA recommendations as a moderating variable, for which P3 could 
be used to develop and test a hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for the study of IA effectiveness 
and its linkages to the context in which internal audit is practiced, and to organisational 
performance. The paper has employed institutional theory and Marx's theory of the circuit of 
industrial capital to synthesize the extant IA literature to develop some propositions as well as 
offer an operational research agenda. The review has argued that IA effectiveness is 
influenced by the dynamics prevailing in an IA setting. It is also argued that, as IA is aimed 
to assist organisations to achieve objectives, a positive association between internal audit's 
level of compliance with the standards for professional practice of internal auditors and with 
organisational performance could serve as an additional approach to assess IA effectiveness. 
As always, propositions developed in this paper need to be empirically tested to establish 
their validity. However, as has been pointed out above, empirical testing should not require 
the adoption of a hardcore positivist mindset or an exclusive focus on agency theory. 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework with propositions 
 
 
 
Table I Summary of key relevant literature on internal audit effectiveness 
 
 
 
Notes 
• Also, Sturgeon (1984) indicates that institutional theorists have been using the 
Marxist approach as one way of filling methodological gap of institutional theory. 
This is despite the fact that Sturgeon advocated inquiry within institutional theory 
rather than borrowing from other theories to fill the methodological gap. 
• The other three parties are external auditors, management, and boards of directors. 
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